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NATURAL RESOURCES, FUEL EXPORTS AND 
CORRUPTION POLICY IN AFRICA
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ABSTRACT Theoretical explanations of corruption in Africa are inconclusive. 
Economic downturn and poverty are the effects of poor resource management in 
Africa. Yet, neopatrimonialism also stands as an alternative explanation. This 
survey differentiates these two theoretical alternatives to understanding corruption 
in Africa. It examines 54 African countries using the corruption perception 
index of 2017, finding that fuel-exporting countries in Africa are more corrupt 
than non-fuel exporting countries, with a large associated effect size (Cohen’s 
d =.94). The situation of fuel-exporting countries may be linked with resource-
curse theory (poor resource management) and the extractive theory of corruption 
(neopatrimonialism), while that of non-fuel-exporting countries only with the 
extractive theory of corruption (neopatrimonialism). African nations involved in 
the exportation of fuel resources are 94% more likely to be more corrupt than those 
that are not. 
KEYWORDS: Natural resources, Dutch disease, fossil fuels, oil price, 
embezzlement
INTRODUCTION
A natural resource endowment provides a valuable flow of income to a country, 
helps economies to grow rapidly and prosper, and supports a high standard of 
living (Pendergast – Clarke – van Kooten, 2008; Li, 2013; Cronin – Pandya, 
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2009). Despite these benefits, countries endowed with natural resources are often 
outperformed in terms of economic development, long-term economic growth, 
and poverty reduction by countries that are not naturally rich in the former 
(Li, 2013; Sachs − Warner, 1995;1997). The situation of Africa, particularly 
Sub-Saharan Africa, is an example of how natural resource endowments can 
suffocate development and distract the government from the central task of 
ensuring long-term prosperity (Timms, 2016). 
Resource Curse theory gives a possible explanation for this paradox; it suggests 
that economies that produce mineral resources may become distorted due to 
their vulnerability to shocks from additional and unforeseen profits that are 
generated by exports (Weeks, 2012). It explains that public expenditure is more 
effectively used for development in countries that lack natural resources because 
their citizens (who are directly responsible for generating these funds) scrutinize 
government spending. In contrast, government spending is not scrutinized the 
same way by citizens of resource-rich countries because extractive industries 
rather than citizens pay taxes, royalties, and other payments to generate the 
public funds needed for development (Silje, 2007; Kelley, 2012). This laxity on 
the part of the citizenry makes an economy vulnerable to the exploitation of 
extractive industries by governments through rent-seeking behaviour and the 
prodigal use of public funds which, when exchanged via foreign platforms, 
deplete national wealth (NRGI Reader, 2015; Ades − Di, 1999; Azfar − Lee − 
Swamy, 2001; Pendergast – Clarke − van Kooten, 2008). Nigeria, the Republic 
of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Angola are examples of such economies 
that experience conflict, inefficient spending, and borrowing, “Dutch disease,” 
weak institutional development, and social/environmental problems due to 
the resource curse (Kuzu − Nantogmah, 2010; Durovic, 2016; Basedau, 2005; 
Arazki − van der Ploeg, 2010). Regardless of this, Botswana sets the stage for a 
debate about whether natural resources represent a blessing or a curse (Basedau, 
2005). Even though it is the largest producer of diamonds in the world, Botswana 
has used its earnings to promote economic growth, address social needs, and 
stabilize its economy (Li, 2013; Kuzu − Nantogmah, 2010). Because of this, the 
example of Botswana puts the spotlight on African economies that are naturally 
endowed but unable to improve the national standard of living. This suggests 
that the relationship between natural endowment and living standards remains 
extremely complicated (Pendergast – Clarke − van Kooten, 2008). 
In recent times, research scientists have become intrigued by natural-resource-
related questions such as (Stijns, 2005; Basedau, 2005) whether countries with 
natural resources are blessed or cursed, why do resource-rich countries like 
Nigeria and Angola suffer from the resource curse, whereas Botswana, the 
world’s largest producer of diamonds, enjoys the benefits of its resources, and 
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is there any explanation for the resource curse. Pendergast – Clarken − van 
Kooten (2008), Kelley (2012) and Li (2013) advocate, amongst other things, 
that corruption, defined as the abnormal use of entrusted power for private 
gain (Transparency International, 2018; Nye, 1967), is the primal reason for the 
resource curse. They show that having a natural resource endowment is not 
inherently a curse, but the resource curse transpires due to corrupt government 
officials who reside in resource-rich countries because the latter fail to account 
for the transparent expenditure of public funds and to protect their citizens 
from theft. Consequently, countries that entertain corrupt governments suffer 
from stunted economic growth, mass poverty, poor development, and weak 
institutions (Li, 2013). 
Natural resources do not inevitably represent a curse to countries that are 
resource rich (Basedau, 2005). However, the type of natural resource can affect 
a nation’s vulnerability to corruption and validate resource curse theory (Sala-
i-Martin − Subramanian, 2003; Collier − Hoeffler, 2005). Pendergast – Clarke − 
van Kooten (2008) found that the existence of fuel resources increases potential 
corruption as opposed to ore resources (e.g. diamonds), which appear to reduce 
corruption. Therefore, they consider a fuel resource as a “curse” and ore 
resources as a “blessing.” Their finding explains why Botswana and Nigeria are 
at opposite ends of the scale regarding living standards and economic growth 
(Humphreys – Sachs − Stiglitz, 2007).
FUEL EXPORTATION IN AFRICA
Two-thirds of fuel products are traded across international borders (Ruta 
− Venables, 2012). Fuel-exporting countries enjoy the receipt of tax on fuel 
exports, fuel subsidies, and a lower domestic fuel price relative to the world 
price (Ruta − Venables, 2012). Ironically, as a country’s oil-resource wealth 
increases, so does its inducement to corruption, instability, and patronage-
driven politics (Gillies, 2009; Timms, 2016). Studies show that the vulnerability 
of oil resource-rich countries to price instability and government exploitation 
are associated with higher levels of rent-seeking behavior, corruption, and 
internal conflict (Pendergast – Clarke − van Kooten, 2008; Fearon, 2005; 
Leite − Weidmann, 1999; Van der Ploeg − Poelhekke, 2009). For instance, the 
removal of fuel subsidies in 2012 by the federal government of Nigeria led to 
internal conflict and public protests characterized by strikes by oil and non-oil 
workers, which invariably threatened the shutdown of all oil production in the 
country (EIA, 2012; Agbon, 2016). Furthermore, a court case involving the Vice 
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President of Equatorial Guinea in 2017 was related to corruption, as he was 
convicted of plundering public money from his oil-rich resource country to fund 
a jet-set lifestyle in Paris (Chrisafis, 2017). Similarly, the luxurious lifestyle and 
prodigal spending of government funds by a top government official from the 
oil-rich republic of Congo instigated bribery-related investigations involving an 
Australian company and corrupt officials from the Republic of Congo (McKenzie 
– Freudenthal – Bachelard − Baker, 2016). These instances illustrate some 
of the fundamental reasons for a country’s negative economic performance, 
particularly when political elites perceive resource booms as temporal and 
become avaricious of benefitting from them (Robinson – Torvik − Verdier, 
2006). There are three fundamental elements of the resource curse: resource 
abundance, oil and gas resource dominance, and poor economic performance 
(Kuzu − Nantogmah, 2010; Basedau, 2005).
The effect of the resource curse is detrimental because it influences a country’s 
socioeconomic development, quality of institutions, governance, and prospects 
for democracy and human rights, as well as peace and security (Basedau, 2005; 
Kuzu − Nantogmah, 2010; Li, 2013). These effects are contingent on three 
simultaneous factors that occur due to the resource curse (Kelley, 2012; Aghion 
− Banerjee, 2005; Mehlum − Moene − Torvik, 2005; Deacon − Rode, 2015): 
1) Dutch disease, 2) vulnerability due to price volatility related to commodity 
dependence, and 3) weak governance and poor institutional quality. 
So-called Dutch disease manifests when a country that is naturally resource 
rich tries to raise the value of its currency by diverting the majority of its 
production factors towards the uncompetitive exportation of a natural resource. 
Consequently, Dutch disease is contingent on two situations. The first is a reduced 
revenue flow due to subsequently higher prices of a country’s natural resource in 
the global market that invariably decrease international demand (Kelley, 2012). 
The second is the inflation of local sales of other commodities in an economy 
due to the limited supply of production factors needed to create an abundant 
flow of goods at above the level of demand. Wit & Crookes (2013) illustrated 
the Nigerian case of Dutch disease. They explain, supported by Amadeo (2017), 
that the country’s over-dependence on its oil-resource revenue prompted a rise 
in oil prices in the international market that benefited government spending and 
fuel subsidy rates. In 2011, over 70 percent of Nigeria’s revenues came from oil 
exports (worth $ 99 billion), but the country failed to invest in other areas of 
its economy such as agricultural production (Ohuocha − Akwagyiram, 2016; 
BusinessNews, 2015; News Editor, 2014). Thus, agricultural products were 
locally sold by oligopolies at inflated rates since they could not compete globally 
due to weak investment in agricultural infrastructure (Ohuocha − Akwagyiram, 
2016). In December 2014, the country’s inflexibly high oil prices presented 
NATURAL RESOURCES, FUEL EXPORTS AND CORRUPTION POLICY IN AFRICA 107
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY VOL. 11 (2020) 1
the nation with a revenue crisis due to its inability to sell 35 million barrels 
of oil to international markets (Okere, 2015; Okumagba, 2014; BusinessNews, 
2015). At the same time, the production of crude oil declined by 17,300 and 
700,000 barrel per day in 2014 and 2016, respectively (Okere, 2015; Ohuocha 
− Akwagyiram, 2016). In 2016, Nigeria was officially reported to have slid into 
economic recession caused by Dutch disease due to an increase in the price of 
food and a revenue crisis (Ohuocha − Akwagyiram, 2016). Nigeria’s experience 
shows that the internal inflation of local sales and a simultaneous decline in 
revenue flow threatens the long-term economic sustainability of countries that 
face the resource curse.
Another element of the resource curse manifests when a significant proportion 
of a country’s revenue is derived from the exportation of a single commodity 
that is vulnerable to price fluctuation. An empirical study by Van der Ploeg − 
Poelhekke (2009) found that most commodity-dependent countries experience 
economic underdevelopment due to price volatility. For resource exporters, 
price volatility is another major factor that increases the resource curse (Ruta 
− Venables, 2012). For instance, a fall in the global oil price of more than 60 
percent between June 2014 and January 2015 resulted in a decline in the revenue 
of oil-exporting countries (BusinessNews, 2015). Records show that the net 
oil export revenue of members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC), excluding Iran, declined by 11 percent (from $824 billion to 
$730 billion) in 2013 (BusinessNews, 2015). This price shock made these oil-
dependent countries vulnerable to threats, which reduced their revenue flow and 
drove away foreign investors (News Editor, 2014; Okere, 2015). 
The quality of institutions and governance is another widely hypothesized 
driver of the resource curse (Kuzu − Nantogmah, 2010; Silje, 2007). The way 
a government manages its revenue determines the future state of its economy 
(Pendergast – Clarke − van Kooten, 2008). Arguably, a country’s petrodollar 
earnings can be responsible for weakening the social contract between citizenry 
and the government (Kuzu − Nantogmah, 2010). Evidence from pooled time-
series cross-national data from 113 states between 1971 and 1997 showed that 
oil wealth constrains democratization (Ross, 2001). Natural-resource-dependent 
countries are more likely to be dictatorial, exhibit higher levels of government 
spending, poor governance, and are more prone to a breakdown in democracy 
(Silje, 2007). For oil-exporting countries, Kurecic – Lulic − Kozina (2015) 
and Tsui (2010) showed that a development in governance and institutional 
frameworks is essential at the time petrodollar earnings significantly increase, 
because the absence of the latter can intensify the negative effects of oil discovery 
on democratization. Without appropriate institutional frameworks, economies 
can become overwhelmed with lawlessness and corruption due to rent-seeking 
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behaviour (Anderson − Hill, 2005). Scholars have explained that the existence 
of the oil-resource curse is contingent on bad political governance (Arezki − 
Gylfason, 2011; Mehlum − Moene − Torvik, 2005). For example, countries in 
the Gulf of Guinea that found oil at a time when their democratic institutions 
were undeveloped were plagued with corruption and repression. Furthermore, 
Kurecic – Lulic − Kozina (2015) have explained how ruling elites, who failed to 
govern their countries properly, stole a considerable proportion of oil revenue 
from countries in the Gulf of Guinea. As a result, the resource curse arose due 
to the misappropriation of revenue by corrupt leaders and officials (Li, 2013). 
Corruption and rent on fuel resources have been proven to negatively affect 
overall standards of living across countries (Sala-i-Martin − Subramanian, 
2003; Azfar − Lee − Swamy, 2001). However, improving institutional quality 
can help reduce this negative consequence (Pendergast – Clarke − van Kooten, 
2008).
CORRUPTION IN AFRICA
In Africa, corruption is largely a governance issue, resulting from failed 
institutions and inadequacy of the use of capital to manage society through 
a framework of social, judicial, political, and economic authorizations 
(Gbetnkom, 2012). The increasing desire to transcend impoverishment through 
private wealth-seeking behavior has made corruption pervasive (Gbetnkom, 
2012; Eke − Monoji, 2016). Despite being a notable symptom of the resource 
curse, corruption still presents itself when individuals with the discretion to 
make decisions fail to account for their use of monopolized power over gainful 
resources (Klitgaard, 1988). In such instances, corruption occurs through 
bribery, fraud, nepotism, favoritism, cronyism, and tribalism in the form of 
the deceitful accumulation and abuse of entrusted wealth or power for selfish 
interests (Eke − Monoji, 2016). This brand of corruption has its roots in poverty 
and power, not in countries’ natural resources (Stuckelberger, 2003). 
Corruption takes the form of a state-society relationship whereby public 
officials seek ways to bypass legal competition and obstruct the rules of normal 
societal functioning in order to generate a flow of resources from society to 
state (Gbetnkom, 2012). The corruption of public officials involves two activities 
(Gbetnkom, 2012): the first is influencing the choice of products that are 
supplied to the state and the contract modalities of suppliers at the economic 
level. The second is using the power of office to indulge in financial fraud and 
take advantage of segregated amenities, such as access to privileged schools, 
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sound medical attention, good housing and lodging, or access to the shares of 
enterprises undergoing privatization. For instance, reports have illustrated cases 
of the corruption of African presidents using their offices to influence political 
appointments and win lucrative state contracts in favor of close relatives and 
friends (Cotterill, 2018; Nnanna, 2017; Dentlinger, 2018; Magubane, 2018; 
Calland − Law, 2018). Reports have elucidated how the African continent lost $ 
850 billion between 1970 and 2008 due to fraudulent schemes by governments 
and multinational companies (Anderson, 2015; Hassan, 2017; Mosselmans, 
2014).  Estimates revealed that a total of $ 217.7 billion, $ 105.2 billion, and $ 
81.8 billion was illegally transferred out of Nigeria, Egypt, and South Africa 
(respectively) during that same period (Anderson, 2015). These practices create 
poverty and reduce the national standard of living because they deplete fiscal 
revenue and alter the composition of public expenses (Tanzi − Davoodi, 1998; 
Gbetnkom, 2012).
The theory of extractive corruption provides a potential explanation for 
this form of corruption by re-emphasizing the observation that “all power 
tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely” (Amundsen, 1999). 
This elucidates the situation in which a state becomes the strongest force in 
society, the ruling elite acquires dominant control over state powers, and 
the apparatus of the state is used as an instrument to extract resources from 
society for the benefit of rulers (Amundsen, 1999). This theory is derived 
from the political science notion of authoritarianism, which describes how 
rulers use the power capabilities of the state to attain, retain, and increase 
their power in order to accumulate resources from the nation for personal 
benefit (Amundsen, 1999). It can also be traced back to the neo-patrimonial 
political systems found in Africa, whereby rulers maintain authority through 
personal patronage rather than ideology or law (Amundsen, 1999). This 
neo-patrimonial political system undermines economic reform because it 
involves a life-threatening struggle (at all levels of society) to obtain access 
to state resources through patronage, clienteles, and rent-seeking (Van de 
Walle, 2005; Bayart, 2009; Dawson − Kelsall, 2011; Medard, 2002; Soest, 
2007). As a result, the theory of extractive corruption defines corruption 
as an obstinate symptom of neopatrimonialism that plagues African states 
(Medard, 2002; Kratt, 2015; Beresford, 2014).
Despite being an obstinate plague, corruption has further advanced in most 
African states (Kratt, 2015). African political elites now use anti-corruption 
campaigns as legal-rational justification to discredit their opposition and 
legitimize their corrupt practices (Soest, 2007; Edwards, 2017). A classic 
example, as reported by Paget (2017), is the Tanzanian anti-corruption 
crusade. According to Paget’s report, after the fifth president of Tanzania 
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was sworn into office on 5 November 2015, an anti-corruption campaign 
was ushered in against civil servants and highly positioned elites of the then 
opposition party to win the admiration of the world. However, in 2016, after 
discrediting the opposition and gaining international approval, the president 
legitimized corruption. The president’s legislature undermined legal and 
parliamentary freedom, actualized fractional bans on open rallies, badgered 
mobile police authorities, shut down online political spaces, and indicted 
whistle-blowers under new maligning and dissidence laws. Consequently, 
the case of the fifth president of Tanzania validates the neo-patrimonial 
explanation of corruption. 
Neopatrimonialism provides the best explanation for corruption in African 
politics and governance (Mkandawire, 2015), and is characterized by three 
elements (Ganahl, 2013). The first is presidentialism – a situation where 
leaders, particularly in Africa, go beyond the narrow sense of political control 
to portray themselves as “fathers of the nation” by retaining the presidency 
for decades in other to authenticate the idea that a president is not a mere 
placeholder in office, but rather a founding father with the ability to make key 
decisions without the agreement of the legislature or courts (Ganahl, 2013). 
Prominent followers of this strategy include heads of states in Equatorial 
Guinea, Angola, Zimbabwe, Cameroon, and Uganda (Hanna, 2017). Second, 
clientelism – an exchange relationship between unequal parties that politically 
benefits the agent that is more powerful and offers them material advantage 
in relation to the less powerful agent (Eisenstadt − Lemarchand, 1981). 
Predominant in resource-poor African states, most state agents feel they have 
the right to subvert the rule of law by strategically allocating state revenues to 
their supporters, co-religionists, and members of their own ethnic groups in 
exchange for political patronage (Brun − Diamond, 2014; van de Walle, 2007). 
Gebreluel − Bedasso (2018) have reported how party and state structures in 
Ethiopia used state resources to maintain and increase party membership from 
around 700,000 in 2005 to 7,000,000 in 2015. They also showed how state 
rents were tied to political and bureaucratic appointments through ethnic-
based patronage structures, explaining that party officials and political elites 
mobilize the support of their ethnic constituencies through the assurance of 
treaty maintenance centered on promoting ethnic interests and the power to 
oppress the opposition. The third factor is state resource control – i.e. authority 
and discretion over the use of states’ economic resources (Ganahl, 2013). This 
factor has been cited as one of the primary causes of the failure of growth in 
the developing world, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Arguably, African 
state agents often use state resources to maintain personal control over the 
government rather than investing in basic infrastructure that would create the 
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critical conditions for accelerated development (Paget, 2017). Perhaps this is 
the reason why the forty-fourth President of the United States criticized African 
leaders in his address to the African Union in 2015 (Manson, 2015). Although 
neopatrimonal corruption is widespread in Africa, Botswana has proven to 
be an exception. Despite being influenced by elements of neopatrimonialism 
(Pitcher − Moran − Johnston, 2009; Soest, 2009), the country has avoided 
the major pitfalls that led to the demise of other African countries (Meyns − 
Musamba, 2010). Botswana has maintained a high level of transparency and 
accountability to keep levels of corruption low and to achieve its development 
objectives within a democratic system governed by neopatrimonial exchanges 
of trust (Pitcher – Moran − Johnston, 2009). Consequently, in 2018, Botswana 
was ranked by the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 
as the least corrupt country in Africa (Aljazeera, 2018). Botswana’s triumph 
over corruption may provide other African states with the framework that 
is needed to combat corruption. However, success at replicating Botswana’s 
anti-corruption framework in other African countries may be problematic 
due to contextual differences. On this note, Ganahl (2013) opines that anti-
corruption policies should be tailored to the peculiarities of corruption in each 
African state. 
FUEL EXPORTS AND CORRUPTION
Malfunctioning government institutions have been found to severely harm 
economic performance by reducing both incentives and opportunities to invest 
and innovate (North, 1990; Shleifer − Vishny, 1993). Among the different 
aspects of governance, corruption has received particular attention from 
both policymakers and researchers. Thus, understanding the role that various 
types of exports have on corruption has been the fundamental rationale for 
empirical studies on resource exports and corruption. Scholars have argued that 
the severity of the resource curse in malfunctioning government institutions 
depends on the kinds of resources that are valuable in relation to a country’s 
revenue. The former have suggested that point-source resources such as 
minerals and fuels are more problematic because their centralized control can 
generate rents that are easily appropriable (Sala-i-Martin − Subramanian, 2003; 
Boschini – Petterson − Roine, 2007). One such study, conducted by Leite and 
Weidmann (1999), argued that natural resource abundance is an important factor 
in determining a country’s level of corruption because it creates opportunities 
for rent-seeking behavior. With the help of a corruption regression equation, 
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their study established that capital-intensive natural resources (such as fuel and 
ores) tend to induce higher levels of corruption compared to labor-intensive 
resources. Their study constituted the first step toward investigating natural 
resources and corruption. In context, their results create a model with which to 
guide government anti-corruption policies. 
A more recent study by Goel − Korhonen (2011) examined the relationship 
between export structure and corruption across nations. The study used 
ordinary least squares, quantile regression, and two-stage least squares methods 
to derive a model estimate for corruption across nations. The model showed 
that economic prosperity, political freedom, economic freedom, government 
size, fractionalization, and exports are all factors that determine the level of 
corruption. It also demonstrated that fuel exports and corruption in the most 
corrupt nations are statistically positively related. The authors argue that the 
varied direction and magnitude of the effects of various resource types on 
corruption, such as anti-corruption policies, must be tailored to fit the specific 
resource types. Though bad management of fuel-resource-related gains may 
signal a clear danger to economic prosperity and poverty reduction, theoretical 
explanations are inconclusive. Therefore, by proposing that fuel-exporting 
countries are more corrupt than non-fuel-exporting countries in Africa, the 
current study provides empirical evidence in support of the extractive theory 
of corruption and the resource curse theory. Such evidence also offers potential 
insights into the formulation of effective policies that could help control the level 
of corruption in fuel resource-rich countries, particularly Africa, and offers 
support for theoretical frameworks that best explain corruption in the African 
context. 
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Corruption was used as the dependent variable of the study because it has 
been identified as widespread in Africa (Pitcher − Moran − Johnston, 2009; 
Shleifer − Vishny, 1993). A total population of 54 African nations participated 
in the study. Study participants were classified into fuel-exporting countries 
and non-fuel-exporting countries, as identified by the United Nations (2017). 
Out of the 54 countries that participated in the study, 12 were major exporters of 
fuel. The sampling frame for fuel-exporting and non-fuel-exporting countries is 
illustrated in Table 1 and Table 2, respectively. 
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Procedure 
The study employed an independent samples t-test to answer the question 
whether fuel-exporting countries differ significantly in the prevalence of 
corruption compared to non-fuel exporting countries. Secondary data was 
obtained from Transparency International (2018) to measure the prevalence of 
corruption. The study hypothesized that the prevalence of corruption in fuel-
exporting countries is not equal to that in non-fuel-exporting countries in Africa 
(H1) against the null hypothesis that corruption is equal in the two groups of 
countries. More precisely, due to the inverse coding of the corruption perception 
index (CPI) used to assess corruption, it is expected that fuel-exporting countries 
are associated with statistically significantly higher corruption (more negative 
CPI scores) than non-fuel-exporting countries in Africa. 
Measures 
Corruption was measured using scores for 2017 from the Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI). The CPI was established in 1995 as a composite 
indicator for measuring the level of corruption perceived in the public sector 
worldwide. CPI ranks corruption on the scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 
(very clean) based on the assumption that all countries are corrupt to varying 
degrees. Lower-ranked countries are plagued with higher levels of corruption 
and suffer from untrustworthy and badly functioning public institutions such 
as police and judiciary. Higher-ranked countries tend to have lower levels of 
corruption and enjoy greater press freedom, access to information about public 
expenditure, stronger standards of integrity for public officials, and independent 
judicial systems, but may still engage in closed-door deals, illicit financing, 
and unreliable law enforcement that can distort public policy and exacerbate 
many forms of corruption at home and abroad. For more information on the 
methodology and reliability of CPI, see Transparency International (2017). CPI 
has been validated by Wilhelm (2002) through correlational studies that find 
strong significant connections between two measures of corruption and real 
gross domestic product per capita (RGDP/Cap).
Statistical Analysis
The parameters of the study were described using frequency distributions, 
means, standard deviations, skew, kurtosis, and a bar chart. Furthermore, 
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inferences were drawn using the independent samples t-test, Levene’s F test, 
and Cohen’s d. Descriptive and inferential statistical analysis was undertaken 
with the use of Microsoft Excel 2016 and SPSS version 21. 
RESULTS
Fuel-exporting countries (N = 12) are associated with a corruption perception 
index M = 24.58 (SD = 7.20). By comparison, non-fuel-exporting countries (N 
= 42) are associated with a numerically greater corruption perception index M 
= 34.23 (SD = 12.26). To test the hypothesis that fuel-exporting countries are 
associated with statistically significant more negative corruption perception 
index scores than non-fuel-exporting countries in Africa, an independent 
samples t-test was performed. As can be seen in Table 4, the fuel-exporting 
and non-fuel exporting distributions were sufficiently normal to permit the 
implementation of a  t-test (i.e., skew < |2.0| and kurtosis < |9.0|; Schmider − 
Ziegler − Danay − Beyer − Buhner, 2010). Additionally, the assumption that 
variances were homogenous was tested and satisfied via Levene’s F test, 
F(1,52) = 2.95, p = .092. The independent samples t-test was associated with 
a statistically significant effect, t(1,52) = -2.59, p = .006 (one-tailed). Cohen’s d 
was estimated at .85, which is a large effect based on Cohen’s (1992) guidelines. 
A graphical representation of the means and the 95% confidence intervals is 
contained in Figure 1. The study found that there is a 95% chance that the mean 
difference lies between -17.13 and -2.18, which does not include zero. Thus, the 
study did not support the null hypothesis that the prevalence of corruption in 
fuel-exporting countries is the same as non-fuel-exporting countries in Africa. 
Thus, H1 is supported. The study found that there is a significant difference 
in the prevalence of corruption between fuel-exporting and non-fuel exporting 
countries (a mean difference of  0).
DISCUSSION 
Fuel-exporting countries were found to be more corrupt than non-fuel-
exporting countries in Africa. This proposition supports resource curse theory 
and gives insights into the implication of fuel exportation and corruption levels. 
The results clearly indicate that fuel exportation is positively associated with 
significant levels of corruption. By implication, increases in fuel exportation 
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also translate into a significant increase in corruption. Prior to this study, 
Goel − Korhonen (2011) established a model to estimate the relationship 
between resource exports and corruption. Furthermore, Leite − Weidmann 
(1999) evaluated the relationship between capital- and labour-intensive natural 
resources (such as fuel, ores, food, and agriculture) on corruption. Their studies 
enumerated various factors that have statistical effects on corruption. However, 
their studies did not compare significant differences in corruption between 
fuel- and non-fuel exporting countries. Research from Leite − Weidmann 
(1999) categorized fuel and ores as capital-intensive natural resources that 
play a role in increasing corruption, but the findings were unable to determine 
the unique contributions of fuel exportation to corruption. The current study 
represents a unique contribution to the corruption literature by determining 
that fuel-exporting countries are significantly more likely to be associated 
with corruption compared with non-fuel exporting ones. However, the study 
did not establish causality between fuel-exportation and corruption. The study 
has also contributed to the literature by providing evidence within the African 
context that helps distinguish theoretical explanation of corruption. It identifies 
poor resource management as a distinguishing element of the difference in 
corruption between fuel-exporting countries and non-fuel-exporting countries 
in Africa. Theoretically, African countries that export fuel do badly in terms 
of resource management because of the kind of resource that dominates their 
export portfolio. To reduce corruption levels, fuel-exporting parts of Africa 
must formulate fuel-specific policies that address poor resource management 
(the extractive theory of corruption). Perhaps a more diversified export portfolio 
characterized by a significant proportion of non-fuel exports may reduce the 
presence of corruption and restrict the manifestation of the resource curse. 
Contingent on the limitations of this study, future studies are advised to focus 
on a wider sample of developing economies.
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TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1 Mean Corruption Perception Index scores for fuel-exporting countries in Africa 
Countriesa Corruptionb
Algeria 33
Angola 19
Cameroon 25
Chad 20
Congo, Rep. 21
Côte d'Ivoire 36
Egypt 32
Equatorial Guinea 17
Gabon 32
Libya 17
Nigeria 27
Sudan 16
a Fuel-exporting countries based on United Nations categorization (United Nations, 2017)
b Corruption score based on the corruption perception index (Transparency International, 2018)
Table 2 Mean Corruption Perception Index scores for non-fuel-exporting countries in Africa
Countriesa Corruptionb
Benin 39
Botswana 61
Burkina Faso 42
Burundi 22
Cabo Verde 55
Central African Republic 23
Comoros 27
Democratic Republic of Congo 21
Djibouti 31
Eritrea 20
Ethiopia 35
Gambia 30
Ghana 40
Guinea 27
Guinea Bissau 17
Kenya 28
Lesotho 42
Liberia 31
a Fuel-exporting countries based on United Nations categorization (United Nations, 2017)
b Corruption score based on the corruption perception index (Transparency International, 2018)
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Table 3 (Continued) Mean Corruption Perception Index scores for non-fuel-exporting 
countries in Africa
Countriesa Corruptionb
Madagascar 24
Malawi 31
Mali 31
Mauritania 28
Mauritius 50
Morocco 40
Mozambique 25
Namibia 51
Niger 33
Rwanda 55
Seo Tome and Principe 46
Senegal 45
Seychelles 60
Sierra Leone 30
Somalia 9
South Africa 43
South Sudan 12
Swaziland 39
Tanzania 36
Togo 32
Tunisia 42
Uganda 26
Zambia 37
Zimbabwe 22
a Fuel-exporting countries based on United Nations categorization (United Nations, 2017)
b Corruption score based on the corruption perception index (Transparency International, 2018)
Table 4 Descriptive statistics associated with the samples of the study
N M SD Skew Kurtosis
Fuel-exporting 
Countries
12 24.58 7.20 .32 -1.59
Non-fuel 
exporting 
Countries
42 34.23 12.26 .30 -.21
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Figure 1 Corruption Perception Index bar graph (with 95% CIs)
 

